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I. INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia is a country federated at two levels. At the higher, the federation 
consists of peninsular or West Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak or East 
Malaysia. At the lower, West Malaysia itself consists of several states (with 
hereditary sultans as their heads) and two federal provinces, Melaka and 
Pulau Pinang (Pinang Island), with governors appointed by the federal 
government. Since independence (1957 for the western federation and 1963 
for the eastern), Malaysia has been developing speedily. In the process West 
Malaysia created a host of authorities, boards, commissions, research 
organizations, and even semi-private companies to speed up modernization 
of various industries, to increase production for domestic consumption 
and/or for export, to regulate marketing, and to set prices. 
This paper focuses on the problems of the West Malaysian fishing industry 
in general, concentrating on the fishing industry in the so-called northern 
region.' To some degree, our analysis is also relevant for the problems of 
the whole West Malaysian fishing industry. 
Our purpose is to evaluate the process of modernization of the industry, 
examining 1) how it was helped or hampered by these agencies, and 2) how 
the gains from modernization were shared by owners of factors employed 
in the fishing industry. We also submit at the end of this paper our own 
suggestions for a reform. We base our paper to a degree on published data 
and largely on interviews with government officials in various boards, 
bureaus, commissions, etc., in the federal capital and in second level states 
and provinces of the northern region. Officials of MAJUIKAN were our 
primary source. 
The main agency to regulate and aid fishing is the (Federal) Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. Its main sub-agency dealing with the fishing 
industry is Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia (MAJUIKAN), Fisheries 
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Development Authority. The industry is also regulated by various second 
level states and provinces, and the overabundance of regulators imposes 
additional burdens on the industry.* 
11. FISHING I N  THE NORTHERN REGION 
One peculiar facet of the West Malaysian fishing industry is its multiracial 
composition. Unofficial data as to the racial composition of fishermen in 
the northern region in 1973 are found in table 1. 
TABLE I 
RACIAL COMPOSITION OF FISHERMEN, ORTHERN REGION 
State Malays Chinese Other Total 
Perlis 654 210 406 1,270 
Kedah 4,475 1,62 1 27 6,123 
Pinang 2,696 3,292 55 6,043 
Perak* 2,441 16,800 1 94 19,435 
*The figures for Perak show numbers of fishermen for the whole state. Presumably very few 
of these were living in the northern inland region. 
The total of fishermen in West Malaysia was75,486. 
The races of Malaysia differ much in the size and distribution of their 
incomes. On the average, the Chinese have the highest income, but their 
income distribution is very unequal. Both Chinese and Malay fishermen are 
very poor. 
The Malays are best organized politically. They have been able to  trans- 
late their political power into legislation beneficial to them (for example, 
Bumiputra-native sons companies-get preferred treatment). There are no 
Bumiputra companies engaged in fishing, however. The Malay fishermen 
are numerically too unimportant to wield much political influence. 
As the fishermen in West Malaysia are all very poor,3 a purposeful state 
policy on behalf of this industry, were the gains from it widely shared, 
should contribute to racial harmony (one of the more important publicly 
acknowledged objectives of the Malaysian State). At present the Malaysian 
Chinese are, on the average, the richer, and because of this they look with 
suspicion at any redistributional policies of the government that in their 
view benefit the poorer, i.e., mainly the Malays and other Bumiputra. A 
redistribution policy on behalf of poor fishermen should be acceptable to 
each of the racial groups. 
The fishing industry is of great importance to the Malaysian economy. 
Malaysians, though rich in resources, for various reasons do not nourish 
themselves p r ~ p e r l y . ~  They consume onIy about two thousand calories per 
person per day, and starches predominate in the diet. Their protein intake is 
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especially inadequate, and the lowest levels are observed for rural Malays 
who for religious reasons cannot eat pork, comparatively cheaper than other 
meats. Thus in 1968 the non-pork-eating section of the population consumed 
15.2 pounds of meat per capita per annum; the pork-eating population 
(mainly of Chinese descent) consumed 38.9 pounds. These figures may be 
contrasted with consumption of meats in the developed nations of 100-200 
pounds per capita per annum. 
Clearly, consumption of proteins to become adequate would have to 
increase at a much higher rate than the population. As fish are considered 
edible by all Malaysians, expansion of the fishing industry should have a 
high priority. At present fish catches amount to 330,000 tons; other meats 
and eggs supply only 147,335 tons.5 A small quantity of fish is exported; the 
value of this export is large enough to pay for fish imported by Malaysia, 
making West Malaysia self-sufficient in production of fish proteins. 
In the past, both fresh- and salt-water fishing were done commercially in 
Malaysia. In the northern region, the major areas of fresh-water fishing 
were the mud flats of the Muda River valley. There (after the monsoon 
season) rice was grown, but off-season fishing was an important activity.6 
As Malaysia was a net importer of rice, the federal government decided to 
irrigate the Muda valley, so that two crops of rice a year could be harvested 
there. At a substantial cost to the treasury, the irrigation scheme was suc- 
cessfully executed, and Malaysia became nearly self-sufficient in rice pro- 
duction;' in the process, however, production of fresh-water fish in the 
area was destroyed. 
Fortunately, expansion of fishing in the straits of Melaka turned out to 
be possible, and the increase in salt-water fishing more than offset the loss of 
catch in the Muda River flats. Upswelling currents in the Melaka straits bring 
deep-sea nutrients into shallower waters, which turn into breeding grounds 
and teem with valuable fish. 
Because of a moderate incline of the sea bed, the straits fishing grounds 
can be divided into four categories. 1) There is a shallow offshore strip where 
the more valuable fish breed. Any commercial fishing there would be destruc- 
tive to this national Malaysian resource. The Malaysian states and provinces, 
therefore, forbid commercial fishing in a strip extending seven miles from the 
shore. 2) Further away, the straits for miles are shallow enough to permit 
commercial bottom fishing. This is a highly profitable operation, but these 
grounds are limited. An element of monopoly has to be introduced by the 
states (provinces) to protect them from overfishing. 3) As the sea gradually 
deepens, one has to change from bottom to sea level fishing, but farther from 
the shore cutters and trawlers used for fishing must be larger than near-shore 
vessels to be seaworthy. In other words, such fishing must become more 
capital-intensive. 4) Finally, Malaysians could undertake ocean fishing. 
This requires large capital investment in ocean-going fishing ships, and so 
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far Malaysia has not created such fleets. As Malaysians are, historically, 
experienced seafarers, this development remains a potentiality not to be 
overlooked when expansion of fishing becomes a national necessity. 
Fishing offshore of West Malaysia is further complicated by the sea laws 
that limit national control of the seas. Until such laws are changed, much of 
Melaka straits is also open to fishing by other nations, especially by the 
Japanese, the Burmese, and the Thai. Indonesian fishermen are not a problem 
since they still have muchof their own offshore waters to develop. 
After the Malaysians switched to more salt-water fishing, it soon became 
clear that the profitable bottom fishing in the straits of Melaka is a limited 
resource, vulnerable to over-fishing. There are, however, problems involved 
in protecting the straits. Legal regulations cannot be made flexible enough. 
Specifically, the fish breeding grounds do not coincide with the seven-mile 
offshore limit on fishing and often extend further than that. Valuable young 
fish often go into the zone where bottom fishing is permitted, and get caught 
there, as may be seen from the high percentage of trash fish often caught by 
bottom fishing methods.8 
To avoid the constraint, Malaysia may further develop its fishing on the 
eastern shores of Wes.t (peninsular) Malaysia and on the northern shores of 
East (Timur) Malaysia, i.e., off the island of Borneo. This, of course, would 
benefit fishermen living near such coasts but will not help the fishing industry 
in the northern region. The distances make such fishing unprofitable for 
the northern region fishing fleets. 
The only reasonable way to protect the fishing in the straits is by regula- 
tion. We have already mentioned the prohibition of commercial fishing in 
the seven-mile offshore strip. More important has been restriction of the 
numbers of fishing licenses issued by the states. Given the small size of 
boats in the straits, license restriction effectively restricts the size of the 
catch, protecting the straits from depletion. Unfortunately, this environ- 
mental measure is equivalent to a government monopoly of fishing rights. 
The question was, who was to receive the monopoly rents from fishing in 
the straits? Federal or state governments could have operated the industry 
as a monopoly but decided not to. Still, they could have tried to reap the 
monopoly rent by auctioning fishing licenses. Whether they would have 
been successful we shall never know, because auctions of licenses were not 
tried.9 
Instead, governments charged moderate fees for operating fishing equip- 
ment and fishing boats, foregoing collection of monopoly rents from fish- 
ing.10 A redistributional decision had to be made. Licenses could have been 
issued to fishermen organizations (co-ops or partnerships), an action which 
would have alleviated the abject poverty of this group, but such a policy to 
be successful would require provision of capital as well to the fishermen. 
To avoid this cost the states issued licenses not to fishermen but to financiers, 
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who were able to provide the boats and finance the operations themselves. 
As straits fishing has been very profitable, the financiers were most willing 
to buy licenses and organize the fishing. The uneducated and miserably 
poor fishermen had no alternative but to join as hired crews. 
111. THE FISHING INDUSTRY I N  PINANG AND LANGKAWI ISLANDS 
Better to understand problems of the fishing industry in the northern 
region, we paid special attention to sea bottom fishing in the straits of Melaka 
by two groups of fishermen: those of Pinang and those of the Langkawi 
Islands. 
In the Pinang area, bottom fishing (seven miles offshore) is done by 
trawlers of ten to  twenty ton capacity with crews of four fishermen (including 
the captain). Up to 280 fishing licenses are granted to financiers who supply 
the boat, hire the crew, and advance operating costs (fuel, ice, etc.). The 
trawlers use Batu Maung on Pinang Island as their port, but neither do the 
fishermen live there nor do the buyers of fish have their offices there. The 
latter live and operate in Pinang City (some financiers, themselves, are fish 
buyers). After each catch, trawlers return to Batu Maung, the fish are classi- 
fied as trash fish (from 40-50% of the catch) or human-consumption fish 
and divided by type into separate baskets. The crew does not have any 
means to weigh the fish nor any idea of prevailing prices paid that day by 
the fish buyers. The trash fish are taken by a trustee of a fish cooperative to 
which the financiers belong." The valuable fish are taken by the financier 
to Pinang and the next day the crew is told the value of its share in the catch. 
From the total value obtained by the financier (according to his account), 
the first M$200 is subtracted to cover his expenses and the remainder 
divided in two, half for the financier, half for the crew. The average income 
of an able fisherman (one share) comes to about M$100 per month, but 
wages may vary around the average. The captain and the first mate usually 
get one and a half shares; in addition, the captain may also get a commission 
if the catch is good. The low income of fishermen is partly due to a large 
content of trash fish in the catch. Insofar as trash fish includes young valu- 
able fish that prefer coastal waters, one suspects that many crews may be 
breaking the law by fishing too close to the shore for prawns. Such practices 
damage the ecology of the straits, depleting them of future mature human- 
consumption fish. 
Clearly, the low incomes of Pinang fishermen are a result of their weak 
market power.12 They have no boats of their own, hence can only be hired 
hands. The law, by selling licenses to financiers, favors the latter. The crew 
has no control over the sale of its catch, does not know the weight, does not 
know what prices are in fact obtained, or whether or not the fish are sold to 
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the highest bidders. The marketing of trash fish is of little value to the crew, 
who get only 2 cents per kati (one kati weighs 1.33 pounds) for it. 
Somecrews, infuriated by their low incomes, strike back. They are tempted 
to sell part of their catch for cash on the seas to  foreign ships, pocket the 
proceeds, and bring back only the remainder. If the financier suspects the 
crew, he can sack them, but with little confidence that his next crew will be 
any better. Lately, some of the financiers have put a trusted man (often a 
family member) among the crew. In any case, the risk involves some costs 
and these increase the need for a larger margin to the financier. Although 
it is the system under which the financiers operate that causes the need for 
controls, it is theconsumer who pays, in higher prices of fish. 
Prices of fish delivered to the port (hereafter called "ex boat") are difficult 
to establish, for there are no published statistics. Averages can be obtained 
from MAJUIKAN officials but only for their operations at Langkawi 
Islands. To get some idea about ex boat prices a t  Batu Maung we visited 
the port and interviewed several fishermen leaving boats for home. They 
claimed that often their catch of valuable fish brings them only ten Malaysian 
cents per kati on the average. Given the sharing system, this figure translates 
into twenty-five Malaysian cents ex boat per kati. This, of course, is only 
the lower limit of the ex boat price range. Against this one may consider the 
whole spread of retail fish prices per kati in Kuala Lumpur, which runs 
from 45 cents for small Chencharu, to M$2.60 for Bawal Puteh, to M$3.48 
for medium prawn (all these quotations are for the first quarter of 1973). 
Clearly, the average margin over ex boat prices is not as large as the figures 
compared here might indicate, but it is substantial, 
At Langkawi MAJUIKAN (Alor Star Branch) started a very interesting 
experiment. It bought twelve trawlers (thirty-ton capacity), hired crews of 
six for each trawler, and now runs them somewhat along the lines of the 
private operations at Pinang. There are, however, differences, and the most 
important is that MAJUIKAN has a subsidiary company in Pinang that 
buys fish and pays better prices than private buyers. Specifically, we found 
that in a particular (considered representative) catch the ex boat average 
price per kati was 91 cents, almost four times the above-quoted lowest price 
of 25 cents. 
The captain of the crew also gets a small commission from MAJUIKAN's 
share if the catch is good. Finally, 10% of fishermen's income (shares) is 
banked at interest and is available only in case of emergency or at retirement. 
in the MAJUIKAN operation the amount of trash fish is smaller, repre- 
senting only 10-15% of the catch. Despite this, the average income of an 
able fisherman is onIy slightly higher (M$120 per month) at Langkawi than 
at Pinang (M$100 per month). The reason is that some boats have small 
catches or high repair and maintenance costs. One must also suspect in- 
efficiency or cheating (selling on the high seas).l3 
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IV, FISH MARKETS 
The fish markets in western Malaysia are oligopolistic, and we suspect a 
high level of collusive behavior among the financiers organizing the in- 
dustry.14 The monopolistic powers of the latter are strengthened by govern- 
ment limitations on issuance of licenses for bottom fishing and transfer of the 
resulting monopoly profits to financiers already engaged in the industry. To 
compound the inequitable distribution of the value added in the fishing 
industry, markets in which fish are sold are far from competitive. This is 
not a peculiar feature of fish marketing alone. Many other industries in 
Malaysia have a similar problem. 
In general, specialized wholesalers create their own networks of buying 
agents and of retailers. Members of these networks are tied to the respective 
wholesalers by financial arrangements (credit). Insofar as most of the whole- 
salers are of Chinese descent, the network has its ties further strengthened 
by consanguinity (members are either relatives or at least members of the 
same Chinese clan). Above all, network ties are strengthened by collusive 
behavior among the wholesalers themselves. Any retailer who might refuse 
to accept a delivery because his wholesaler overcharges him would be cut off 
from further supplies by him, and no other wholesaler will deal with the 
'"ebel." 
Further proof of oligopolistic structure and collusive behavior of whole- 
sale fish markets is based on price behavior. Official data for the first quarter 
of 1973 quote fish prices for several regional markets.15 Three will interest 
us here: Pinang Island, Ipoh, and Kuala Lumpur. Only Pinang Island is in 
the northern region, but the market at Ipoh in the state of Perak draws 
perhaps some fish caught in the region. Both markets also export fish to the 
national capital in Kuala Lumpur, hence our interest in this third market. 
The data seem t o  support the claim that there is no national market in 
fish in West Malaysia if we define national market as one in which regional 
market prices usually differ only by the cost of transporting a given good 
from the exporting to the importing region, plus a normal profit. Shipping 
cost of a pikul (100 kati, or 133 Ib.) of fish from Pinang or Ipoh to Kuala 
Lumpur, with cost of ice added, could not exceed M$10, and adding a margin 
for profit and weight loss from evaporation, wholesale prices at Kuala 
Lumpur should not be more than M$20 (per pikul of any kind of fish) higher 
than the price in the exporting region. We find, however, that in the first 
quarter of 1973 the market price differential was about M$50-60 and, in the 
case of prawns, about M$100 or even more. One must presume that such 
price differentials are representative of wholesale fish market operations in 
West Malaysia. If the markets were competitive, some wholesalers could 
bring the cheaper fish into Kuala Lumpur and force prices down greatly. As 
that does not happen, one must presume that wholesalers do  not need to 
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fear such imports and (being stocked with high priced fish) keep the old price 
until the stocks are gone. This is compatible with profit maximization but 
markets are then monopolistic or collusively oligopolistic. For the Malaysian 
people this has meant high prices to consumers in Kuala Lumpur, low prices 
to fishermen in Pinang and Ipoh. Only the wholesalers in Kuala Lumpur 
are protected from the consequences of their overstocking with fish, for 
which both the primary producers and final consumers have to pay. 
MAJUIKAN is aware of great imperfections in Malaysian fish markets 
and is in the process of forcing fish auctions. The auction system is not yet 
operative in the northern region. Whether this measure by itself will bring 
substantial competition to fish marketing remains to be seen. Probably many 
additional measures need to be taken concurrently before competition in 
wholesale markets is enforced.16 
V. EVALIJATION 
We have shown in the preceding sections that: 
1) The market for fisherman labor is oligopsonistic. The financiers hire 
crews as if they all were representing one employer. The hand of financiers 
is further strengthened by a) existence of collusive practices, perhaps arrived 
at and enforced by the so-called fishing cooperatives (in fact trade associa- 
tions of the financiers), and b) existence of governmental monopoly through 
issuance of a limited number of licenses for sea bottom fishing. As Malaysian 
governments did not try to extract the resulting rnon'opoly rents for them- 
selves, and issued licenses to previous licensees, profits of the latter must 
have increased and stabilized at such higher levels. 
2) The market for fish is also oligopolistic, concentrated in the hands of a 
few wholesalers who are also able to tie some of the financier boat owners 
directly to themselves.17 Because of high levels of colIusion in both markets, 
"monopoly" and "monopsony" models describe these markets fairly well. 
3) Poorly educated fishermen have no incentive to  switch jobs, because 
unskilled labor in other fields is equally ill-paid. Therefore, the labor supply 
for fishing remains inelastic. 
The concentration of market power in both markets resulted in low wages 
for Malaysian fishermen, and in general in very unequaI distribution of 
incomes out of value added by the fishing industry. 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the effect of concentration and monopo- 
lization, in this case our estimate is that the decline in fishermen wages was 
steep; the latter probably got only half the wage they would have received 
had the markets been competitive. 
Clearly Malaysian fishermen do not get their proper share in gains from 
economic development. Market imperfections explain this to a degree, but 
governments by their desire to protect environment contributed also to the 
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weakening of fishermen's economic position. A monopoly of fishing rights 
in the straits of Melaka has been created, and the resulting monopoly rents 
have been inadvertently passed to financiers. 
VI. POLICY PROPOSALS 
The fishing industry of West Malaysia--especially in the northern region 
-is in a precarious ~osi t ion.  It is a major producer of protein supply in a 
nation starved for proteins; but its most profitable form (bottom fishing) 
cannot be expanded, at least in the straits of Melaka, for environmental 
reasons. Its "monopolistic-monopsonistic" nature also makes the industry 
inefficient and produces great income inequality. Thanks to the preponder- 
ance of the market intermediaries and financiers, the fishermen themselves 
are kept abjectly poor, but consumer prices are high. The basic objectives of 
the government should be to bring more competition to fish marketing and 
to reorganize the industry in general, so that a more equitable distribution 
of incomes will result. 
Bringing competition to fish marketing in Malaysia will not be easy. Many 
other industries of Malaysia suffer the same problems. So far, governmental 
solutions have taken the form of regulation of marketing, mainly through 
the licensing of agents, both buyers and sellers. Licensing, however, only 
substitutes private monopoly for public and does not assure operating at 
purely competitive prices. 
MAJUIKAN wants to impose auctioning of fish in public, regulated 
markets. Such would appear to be a step in the right direction, but one 
doubts whether this measure alone could restore competition. A more basic 
restriction of competition is hidden in the tying of retailers and purchasing 
traders to a single wholesaler. Tying to a wholesaler firm, enforced by collu- 
sion with other wholesalers, is mainly responsible for the present structure 
of fish and other produce trading in Malaysia. 
To break the ties between the retail and wholesale trade, positive steps 
will be needed. Introduction of vigorous trading cooperatives might be one, 
but so far in Malaysia such cooperatives have atrophied in this function. 
Development of supermarkets might help. Some state-supported develop- 
ment of refrigerating and freezing units might also bring price stability and 
less spoiling of fish. Also more competition might result if information about 
market conditions is more widely disseminated. Perhaps publicly operated 
scales a t  ports would help. The fish buyers might be issued licenses only if 
they open offices at the fishing port (perhaps only three fishing ports are 
needed in the northern region: at Batu Maung, Kuala Kedah, and Langkawi). 
They should post their prices each day so that the crews may know them in 
advance, or at least at the time the financier takes over the catch. Also, the 
fishing licenses of any Malaysian state should not restrict selling of the fish 
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exclusively to ports of the state issuing the license. Elimination of this 
restriction might prevent unneeded costs and make fish buyers more 
competitive. 
The second major objective should be reorganizing the industry itself. 
The task should be comparatively easy because the lack of market power of 
fishermen is attributable mainly to human causes. Clandestine collusion 
among financiers should be made illegal. Specifically, the present fishing 
cooperatives should be disbanded and replaced by a single fishing coopera- 
tive whose membership is open to all crews. The trash fish should be sold by 
this cooperative at auctions to fish meal operators, and the proceeds after 
cost credited to crews according to their catch of trash fish. The licenses to 
fish should be given to crews or their captains, and not to financiers (the 
boat owners would then hire only fishermen with licenses to fish). 
A major step in giving the fishermen market power would be dispersion 
of ownership of boats. Ideally the smaller boats should belong to the crews 
(preferably partnerships or small cooperatives) or to individual captains. A 
start can be made by changing the MAJUIKAN experiment in the Langkawi 
Islands. At present MAJUIKAN forces the employed crews to  save by 
banking a small part of their earnings. The savings could be increased by 
adding captains' commissions (the latter perhaps even doubled to give 
captains an incentive to produce good catches). MAJUIKAN could permit 
withdrawal of savings for the purpose of buying boats, and could also 
auction its older boats used at the Langkawi Islands experiment to fisher- 
men (but not to financiers). 
If such a policy becomes successful, the government could initiate low 
interest state loans to the fishing crews so that they may buy boats belonging 
to financiers in Pinang.18 The laws supporting "Bumiputra" (native sons) 
firms could be appropriately extended to fishing. 
The reforms proposed here need not be construed as inimical to financiers. 
Their capital could be reinvested in ocean going fishing ships for which 
licenses should be issued to financiers as well as to any applying captain, 
and the Malaysian state could give tax incentives in such cases (as it does 
now to many other "new" industries). l 9  
As for the monopoly rents from issuance of a limited number of licenses 
to bottom fishing boats, there are two alternatives to the present system of 
passing them to the financiers. They could be extracted by auctioning 
licenses, but that would make development of fishermen-owned fleets diffi- 
cult. Perhaps for the time being such monopoly rents should not be extracted 
by the states, but passed to crews with licenses. This would speed up the 
process of developing fishermen owned fleets; and only after a transitional 
period should the matter be reconsidered. 
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1. The northern region, a s  defined by authorities, conslsts of states-Perlis, Kedah, north- 
western part of Perak-and the province of Pulau Pinang (including the Island of Pinang and 
the former [continental] province of Wellesley). Apparently the Federal government of western 
Malaysia is worried about the lagging development and the increase in income inequality in this 
region. The National Action Committee set up the Northern Malaysian Regional Action Com- 
mittee, giving the Economic Planning Unit (E.P.U.) the task of preparing policy proposals and 
coordinating the workings of this body. 
2. One cause of the "excess" is the federal structure of West Malaysia. The provinces, 
states, and the federal government all have a role. Licensing belongs to the state or  province. 
These usually require that licensees sell the fish in provincial markets. Thus, if a boat is on high 
seas and the captain wishes to  sell the catch, the boat has to return to its base, even if other ports 
are closer and offer higher prices for fish. Such a regulation unnecessarily increases costs (diesel 
fuel burned, time lost) and decreases the revenue (price obtained). 
3. For data and need of redistribut~on, see Donald R. Snodgrass, "The Fiscal System as an 
Income Redistributor in West Malaysia," Publrc Frnance 29, no. I (1974): 58. According to 
Snodgrass, the mean household income per month in West Malaysia in I970 was M$267, while 
the mean income of fishermen's households in 1973 or 1975 would be half of that  o r  less. Income 
inequality in West Malaysia is high. Snodgrassestimates the Ginicoefficient to be ,502. 
In 1974 the U.S. dollar exchanged for about 2.40 Malaysian dollars, but the purchasing 
power of the Malaysian dollarwas higher, about equal to 75 U.S. cents. 
4. See Anuvar bin Mahmud, "Food Problems in Malaysia," Food Problems in Asia and 
the Paclfic, Proceedings of a seminar held at  East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 1970. 
5. Ibid. See especially p. 192, table 2. 
6. See "The Boom Which Turned into a n  Avoidable Slump," Malaysian Business (Febru- 
ary 1975): 8-17. 
7. At present Malaysia is almost self-sufficient in rice (thanks to  Muda Valley Irrigation 
Scheme), fish, pork, and poultry. Beef must be imported, as  must maize, soy beans, etc. There 
are some exports of tapioca and tropical fruits, but  other fruits have to  be imported. For data 
on Malaysian exports and imports see: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Sratistlcal Digest, 
1966-1971, pp. 78, 92, 93, and 94; and Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority, Quarterly 
Commodity Statrsircs 4,  no. I (Jan/ March 1973). 
8. Trash fish conslsts of inedible fish (for example, starfish), damaged fish, and fish that 
are too small to be eaten. In the latter category one may find a substantial fraction of young fish, 
valuable when grown, but the method of bottom fishing does not permit removal of it from the 
catch and return to  the seas alive. Some catches bring as much a s  40-50% of trash fish. The 
closer to shore one fishes by bottom fishing methods, the more low-priced trash fish will be 
caught. On the other hand, hlgh-priced prawns abound in coastal waters. Coastal police have 
caught numbers of commercial boats fishing in the forbidden zone. A high percentage of trash 
fish in the catch thus raises suspicion that the boat was poaching, though it was lucky to escape 
apprehension. 
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9. In  the Malaysian economic climate, owners of capital (mainly people of Chinese descent 
and foreigners) are accustomed to formation of rings, cartels, and all sorts of collusive organiza- 
tions. It IS, therefore, likely that auctions alone could have failed to collect monopoly rents for 
the states from iishing. 
10. Two types of fees are charged. One schedule sets fees for  use of fishing equipment (First 
Schedule-Regulation 5). One has to pay M$2 per annum for four bag nets, the same for gear 
of barrier nets, draft nets, set of hooks and traps, etc. Fishing stakes cost from M$IO to  M$50 
pergear; trawl nets,dependingon thehorsepower of the boat, cost up to  M$50. 
Fees are also required for operating a boat. The fee varies according to the month of the 
year in which the license is bought and the horsepower of the vessel. Maximum charge is M$35. 
These clearly are moderate fees and in real terms have declined since inflation hit Malaysia 
badly in 1973-74. 
f I .  There are eleven such cooperatives but a lesser number of trustees because several co- 
operatives have the same person for trustee. The trash fish is sold for about 4 %  cents per kati 
(1.33 Ib.). Given the sharing agreement between the financier and his crew, this means 2 cents per 
kati of trash fish to thecrew. 
"Fishing cooperative" is a misnomer. They are not true cooperatives because the existing 
membership must agree by a two-thirds majority vote to take in a new member. Also the mem- 
bers are not fishermen, but financiers. Fishing cooperatives seem to  be clubs or  trade restraining 
associations, strengthening the position of the financiers against the fishermen. 
12. We argue later (see section V) that in the absence of the monopolistic power of whole- 
salers and with competition in fish marketing, fishermen's wages could have been double what 
they wereactually paid. 
13. To  prevent this either the crews could be sacked or  an informer system organized and the 
guilty crews brought before the courts. 
14. The published statistrcs have little to offer in terms of analysis of structures in the markets. 
Census of Wholesale a n d  Retail Trades rn the Urban Areas of Peninsular Malu.~~sia, 1970 (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malays~a, 1974), table 2, p. 2, states that in the urban areas of peninsular Malaysia there 
were 456 wholesale establishments trading in fish. Clearly, this is rather a large number; not 
only numbers but organization of markets counts, however, and that IS not well documented in 
published statistics. 
First, the fish markets, as  will be shown later, are regional-not national-and it is the smaller 
number of such firms in each regional market that is relevant. Second, the wholesale trade is 
heavily concentrated among the Chinese, who (as is well known) oftenenter into trade combines 
because they belongeither to thesameclan or to the same trade association. 
Establishment of trustees to  sell trash fish by the eleven fishing cooperatives in Pinang (see 
also note 11) IS a clear sign of open collusion in marketing of fish. We suspect that these trade 
associations are also a vehicle for other more clandestine collusive arrangements (for example, 
setting local industry-wide conditions of employment of hired labor). We noted that some finan- 
clers are also buyers of fish. 
15. See @arterly Commod~1~~Sratistrcs4, no. I (Jan/ March 1973). 
16. We are not very optimistic that adequate and appropriate measures will be taken. In the 
past, Malays~an governments reacted to lack of competition in trading by licensing. This may 
have helped to  break the ties between various levels of trading, but it resulted in more monopoly 
rather than less. Substitution of private monopoly by bureaucratically enforced monopoly seems 
to solve nothing. Themonopolist~cexploitation power is then strengthened, not weakened. 
17. We noted that in Pinang many financiers are tied to particular wholesalers, o r  are them- 
selves fish buyers. T o  unravel the mystery of who in the Chinese community owns what is per  s e  
a difficult task, and as it was not our objective we left it to  future researchers of the Malaysian 
economy. 
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18. At present fishermen in search of credit may depend only on meager savings of close 
relatives and on advance wages from f~nanciers organizing fishing trips. The latter source de- 
creases further any market power fishermen may have retained. 
Thus, the only source of organ~zed credit could be the (state) Agricultural Bank which dis- 
tr~butes its credit through cooperatives Unfortunately, the cooperative movement m rural 
Malaysia is very weak; whatever exists is very bureaucratic, and fishermen d o  not belong to 
exlstingfishermen cooperatives. 
19. Thus the development of fishing activities may be assigned to the already existing agency 
called PERNAS. 
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